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NOTES
THE VIRGINIA PROCEDURE FOR COMMITMENT AND
RELEASE OF PERSONS ACQUITTED BY REASON OF
INSANITY.
For centuries a state's power to protect society and the individual has
been exercised to commit to mental institutions persons who because of
mental illness are dangerous to themselves or to others.' Persons acquitted of a crime because of insanity are no exception to those who
may be committed. At common law the court ordered confinement in
jail for acquitted defendants who were considered dangerous because of
insanity.' Automatic commitment to mental institutions became the law
in felony cases for defendants acquitted on the ground of insanity.3 Today in most jurisdictions statutes prescribe the procedure by which persons acquitted by reason of insanity are committed to a mental institution. From this simple statement of similarity, only one generality can
safely be propounded. Persons acquitted by reason of insanity are nearly
always committed to a mental institution. 5 Thereafter no generality is
tenable. The post-trial commitment laws of the several states diverge
sharply in a number of respects: the nature of the findings at the
criminal trial, the standard for commitment, the post-trial procedure for
determining present insanity, the standard for release, and the procedures
for later release."
Whatever the procedure or terminology utilized, every post-trial commitment procedure for individuals acquitted by reason of insanity re1. F. LINDmAN & D. MclNTym,

JR., THE MAENTAmY DIsABLED Alam nM LAW 15 (1961).
2. United States v. Lawrence 26 F. Cas. (No. 15577) (C.CD.C. 1835). See also Note,
Compulsory Commitment Following a Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv.
409, 414 n.23 (1961).

S. Insane Offenders Act, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 94 (1800).
4. For a compilation of statutes, see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 725-28 (1962);
Note, Commitment Following Acquittal By Reason Of Insanity and The Equal Protection Of The Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 924 (1968).

5. Greenwald, Dispositionof the Insane Defendant After "Acquittal'-The Long Road
From Conmitment To Release, 59 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S. 583 (1968); Note, Releasing

Criminal Defendants Acquitted and Committed Because of Insanity: The Need for
Balanced Administration, 68 YALE L.J. 293 (1958).

6. See authorities cited supra note 4.
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flects society's belief that the acquittal of those who have demonstrated
their risk to society through acts otherwise criminal may necessitate the
defendant's commitment to a mental institution. 7 All too often this decision is made without any hearing on this need. Civil commitment proceedings are initiated in only a few states to commit persons acquitted
by reason of insanity.8 Statutes in some states variously provide for
mandatory or discretionary commitment if the trial judge, the trial jury,
or a second jury finds that the defendant's insanity continues, or that
his discharge would be dangerous.' In the remaining states, statutes provide for discretionary commitment at the authorization of the trial judge
or mandatory commitment without further hearing on present insanity
of the acquitted defendant. 10
Until 1966 a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity in Virginia,
not unlike defendants in many states, faced mandatory commitment in a
mental institution for an indefinite period without any hearing on present
insanity."' The statute read:
When the defense is insanity or feeble-mindedness of the defendant at the time the offense was committed, the jury shall
be instructed, if they acquit him on that ground, to state the
fact with their verdict. If the jury so find the court shall thereupon if it deem his discharge dangerous to the public peace or
safety, order him to be committed to one of the State hospitals
for the insane and be confined there under special observation
and custody until the superintendent of that hospital and the
superintendent of any other State hospital or feeble-minded colony
shall pronounce him sane and safe to be at large.
Release could be sought through habeas corpus proceedings initiated by
the patient.
In 1966 the Virginia legislature revised the post-trial commitment
and release procedure. 12 Subsequent amendments to this statute were
made in 1968.1' While this revision substantially lessens the plight of
those acquitted by reason of insanity, the imprecision of some of the
terminology and indefiniteness in some of the procedures portend de7. Greenwald, supra note 5, at 583-84.
8. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:59 (1950); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-242(b) (1957).
9. See authorities cited supra note 4.
10. Id.
11. VA. CoD ANN. § 19.1-239 (Supp. 1964), as amended, (Cumulative Supp. 1968).
12. Id. (Supp. 1966).
13. Id. (Cumulative Supp. 1968).
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bate over the judicial administration of this new statute. Examination
of legislation and case law which preceded as well as that subsequent
to the passage of this statute will hopefully make this debate more
meaningful.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The lack of adjudication of present insanity in post-trial mandatory
and discretionary commitment of persons acquitted by reason of insanity has posed a difficult problem for the legal theorist. The most
common rationale advanced for mandatory commitment without a
hearing on present insanity and dangerousness is that insanity at the
time of the crime, once proven, is presumed to continue up to the
time the court commits the accused, and until the accused can prove the
contrary.14 Perhaps the best virtue of the presumption theory "is the
simplicity of its statement... [since] the presumption is ab initio suspect." 1r In those jurisdictions where the defendant is acquitted if there
is even a reasonable doubt about his sanity at the time of the offense, a
presumption of continuing insanity can only be a reasonable doubt as to
present insanity since there has been no affirmative finding of insanity
at any time. 16 Since "[m]ental disorder is not a homogeneous phenomenon .'. . [and] the relevant factor is dangerousness of the individual to self or society . . . variation from case to case [could be]
so large as to make a general presumption of little worth." 17 Moreover, the length of time over which insanity is presumed to continue
is only "a reasonable time." 18 The likelihood that sanity has been
regained is greatly increased when the period of years between commission of the offense and commitment resulting from the limited efficiency of our courts is involved. 9 Furthermore, the presumption of
continuing insanity is only. prima facie evidence of this fact since
continued dangerousness is by no means inevitable, and is rebuttable.20
14. E.g., In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18, 19 (D.D.C. 1957); Ex parte Clarke, 86 Kan.
539, 546, 121 P. 492, 495 (1912); In re Brown, 39 Wash. 160, 162, 81 P. 552, 554 (1905).
15. Hamann, The Confinement and Release of Persons Acquitted By Reason of
Insanity, 4 Hmtv. J. LEcis. 55, 63 (1966).

16. Eg., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); See also Krash,
The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District
of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 934 (1961).
17. Note, supra note 4, at 935.
18. Hempton v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N.W. 596 (1901).

19. Note, supra note 4, at 936.
20. Yankulov v. Bushong, 80 Ohio App. 497, 502, 77 N.E2d 88, 92 (1945).
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An alternative rationale for mandatory commitment is that by pleading not guilty by reason of insanity, the defendant has voluntarily accepted the consequences of the plea, statutory consequences which
include the waiver of a hearing prior to commitment. 2 ' In other words,
the defendant by pleading insanity "digs his own grave" since the
plea takes on the characteristics of "confession and avoidance." 22 The
difficulty with this rationale is that the defendant did not plead present
insanity; he averred that he was insane only at the time of the offense.
Furthermore, this rationale proceeds on the theory that the insanity
defense is a privilege whereas contemporary justice accords the insanity defense as a matter of right.13 Diminished procedural safeguards
as a price for the exercise of a privilege may arguably be justified,
but the argument that unfavorable procedural consequences are voluntarily accepted in the exercise of a right is untenable.
Another justification for mandatory commitment without a hearing
on present insanity is that such a policy discourages false pleas of insanity.2 4 The necessity of such a deterrent is doubtful since in most
cases it would be extremely difficult for an impostor to mislead a
competent psychiatrist. 25 Secondly, the argument fails to mitigate the
deterrent effect mandatory commitment may have on persons who
meritoriously plead insanity but are presently sane, or the problem of
committing those persons neither culpable for their past acts nor presently insane. 26 A similar deterrent effect may also discourage those
who need hospitalization and treatment from pleading insanity.27
A fourth argument for mandatory commitment without a hearing
on present insanity is the need to observe a defendant's mental condition. Future habeas corpus proceedings provide adequate means for
adjudicating the issue of need for continued confinement.28 While ap21. E.g., People ex rel. Peabody v. Chanler, 133 App. Div. 159, 162, 117 N.Y.S. 322,

324 (1909); Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental illness, Some Observations on
the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 230,

238 (1960).
22. Note, supra note 2, at 426.
23. Hamann, supra note 15, at 63; Note, Bolton v. Harris: Equal Protectionin Insanity
Proceedings, 56 GEo. LJ. 1191, 1199-1200 (1968); Note, supra note 2, at 427.
24. E.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962); In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp.
18 (D.D.C. 1957).
25. See H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 45-46 (1954).
26. Note, supra note 4, at 937.
27. Hamann, supra note 15, at 64. See generally Note, stpra note 23, at 1200; Note,
supra note 2, at 428.
28. E.g., Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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pealing on its face, this rationale has serious weaknesses. If mandatory
commitment is justified by the need to observe, commitment would last
only as long as observation was necessary. 29 This necessity for temporary or limited commitment however, has been used to support permanent or indefinite commitment, justified by the availability of habeas
corpus.3 0 Yet in habeas corpus proceedings the confined person must
prove that he is not presently insane, a fact never before averred,
only presumed. 31 Deprivation of liberty under such a procedure is at
the very least suspect.
Because a person acquitted by reason of insanity is sent into confinement pursuant to mandatory commitment statutes without any legal
investigation into his mental condition at the time of the verdict, a
time when he may be perfectly sane, deprivation of liberty without
due process of law has often been argued in constitutional challenges
to these procedures. Underwood v. People is perhaps the only case to
find post-trial mandatory commitment without further hearing violative of due process;32 however, People vu. Dubina, a later case from
the same jurisdiction, distinguished Underwood on the ground of inadequate release procedures following mandatory commitment.Ys In re
Boyett upset discretionary commitment, but the opinion suggests that
the court may have been more concerned with inadequate release provisions than with commitment procedures. 4 Despite the argument that
mandatory or discretionary post-trial commitment is a deprivation of
liberty without due process of law in the absence of an adequate hearing on present insanity, Boyett stands virtually alone among cases in
other jurisdictions which have rejected this claim.as
The proliferation of civil commitment statutes containing liberal
29. See generally Note, supra note 2, at 443-44.
30. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
31. E.g., Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cit. 1958).

See Robinson v.

Winstead, 189 Va. 100, 52 S.E.2d 118 (1949) where the court held that one who is
illegally restrained under an invalid commitment need not prove in a habeas corpus
proceeding that he is sane in order to be discharged.
32. 32 Mich. 1, 20 Am. R. 633 (1875).
33. 304 Mich. 363, 8 N.W.2d 99, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 766 (1943).
34. 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789 (1904).

35. E.g., Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Ex parte Slayback,
209 Cal. App. 480, 288 P. 769 (1930); Ex parte Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 P. 492 (1912);

People ex rel. Peabody v. Chanler, 133 App. Div. 159, 117 N.Y.S. 322 (1909); In re
Brown, 39 Wash. 160, 81 P. 552 (1905). For a compilation of cases, see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 728 (1962).

For an analysis of the due process clause, see Note,

Compulsory Conmzitment Folloning a Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv.
409 (1961).
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procedures for safeguarding those persons suspected of mental incapacity against improvident confinement brought new thinking to bear
on the problem of post-trial mandatory or discretionary commitment
without a hearing on present insanity. The disparity between the civil
commitment procedures and the mandatory commitment procedures
applicable to persons acquitted by reason of insanity was patent. 6 A
constitutional challenge to mandatory commitment procedures based
upon the equal protection clause was inevitable.
Due process challenges to mandatory commitment procedures however, were not dead. In Lynch v. Overholserthe Supreme Court evaded
the constitutional issue of due process, holding that mandatory commitment pursuant to D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301 (d) of a defendant acquitted after an involuntary plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
was "out of harmony with the awareness that Congress has otherwise
shown for safeguarding those suspected of mental incapacity against
improvident confinement." 37 The defendant never suggested that he
was mentally irresponsible. He was acquitted upon evidence that raised
no more than a reasonable doubt as to his mental condition at the
time of the offense.
36. The District of Columbia procedures provided a prime setting for such a challenge.
With nothing more than a finding of reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity at the
time of the offense, mandatory commitment without a hearing as to present insanity
resulted upon acquittal. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 24-301(d) (1961). Release was primarily
dependent upon the superintendent's recommendation. Id. § 24-301(e). Habeas corpus
proceedings could be initiated by the patient seeking release. Id. § 24-301 (g). The patient
had to prove that he was sane, would not be dangerous to himself or others in the foreseeable future, and that the superintendent acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing
to recommend release. Overholser v. Russell, 283 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959). In
civil commitment the Commission on Mental Health examined the allegedly mentally ill
person and thereafter held a hearing. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-542. If the decision of the
Commission was adverse, the person sought to be committed had the right to demand
a jury trial. Id. § 21-544. The burden of proof was on the person seeking commitment.
Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 711 (1962). Release was primarily dependent upon
the superintendent's recommendation, but a patient was entitled to periodic examinations.
Should one of the examining physicians believe that the patient was not mentally ill
to the extent that he was likely to injure himself or others if not hospitalized, the patient
was entitled to a court hearing. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-546 to 548. Patients could also
establish their eligibility for release by habeas corpus. Id. § 24-549.
37. 369 U.S. 705, 711 (1962). The Court's failure to reach the constitutional issue
was characterized by Justice Clark, dissenting, as a "disingenuous evasion." Id. at 733.
The District of Columbia statute read:
If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense, or
tried in the juvenile court of the District of Columbia for an offense, is acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane at the time of its commis-
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[Where] the accused has pleaded guilty-or... the Government
has established that he committed a criminal act constitutes only
strong evidence that his continued liberty could imperil "the
preservation of the public peace." [P] ost-trial commitment... presupposes a determination that the accused has committed the criminal act with which he is charged . . . [but this presupposition]

no more rationally justifies his indeterminate commitment to a
mental institution on a bare reasonable doubt as to past insanity
than would any other cogent proof of possible jeopardy to the
"rights of persons and of property" in any civil commitment ...
[The underlying congressional] intention... seems to have been
... that only those who need treatment and who may be dangerous

are confined; committing a criminal defendant who denies the existence of any mental abnormality merely on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to his condition at some earlier time is surely at
odds with this policyas
The Court did not reach the question of the defendant who pleads
not guilty by reason of insanity. Conjectured legislative considerations
for passing section 24-301 (d) were pertinent only to ascertain whether
the defendant acquitted after an involuntary plea was intended to be
covered by the same provision.8 9
In Baxstrom v. Herold, the Supreme Court faced an equal protection challenge to New York procedure whereby a person nearing
the expiration of his penal sentence could be civilly committed to
a mental institution without the jury review available to all other persons civilly committed. 40 State justification for the procedural dission, the court shall order such person to be confined in a hospital for the
mentally ill.
38. 369 U.S. at 714-15.
39. Id. at 715.
40. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). Speaking of the New York Correction Law § 384 as it appeared when applied to petitioner in 1961, the Court said that the statute
... prescribes the procedure for civil commitment upon the expiration of
the prison term of a mentally ill person confined in Dannermora. Similar
procedures are prescribed for civil commitment of all other allegedly mentally ill persons. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law §§ 70, 72. All persons civilly committed, however, other than those committed at the expiration of a penal
term, are expressly granted the right to de novo review by jury trial of the
question of their sanity under § 74 of the Mental Hygiene Law. Under this
procedure any person dissatisfied with an order certifying him as mentally
ill may demand full review by a jury of the prior determination as to his
competency. If the jury returns a verdict that the person is sane, he must
be immediately discharged. It follows that the State, having made this sub-
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parities was based upon mental classifications distinguishing between
the civilly insane and the criminally insane-those with dangerous or
criminal propensities. Into this latter group fell prisoners found to be
insane while serving a criminal sentence. 4 1 The Supreme Court, rejecting these classifications as a basis for procedural inequality, held that
"[c] lassification of mentally ill persons as either insane or dangerously
insane... may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determining
the type of custodial or medical care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the opportunity to show whether a
person is mentally ill at all." 42
In light of Baxstrorn, the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Lally judicially engrafted onto the procedures for mandatory commitment of persons acquitted by reason of insanity (procedures substantially similar to the District of Columbia mandatory commitment
statute) all of the protections of the New York Mental Hygiene Law
43
dealing with the civil commitment of persons allegedly mentally ill.
Sensing serious constitutional difficulties in the District of Columbia
mandatory commitment statute as a result of the Baxstrom decision,
the court of appeals in Cameron v. Mullen held that a defendant acquitted after an involuntary plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
was entitled to the procedural benefits of the civil commitment statute.44 In Lynch, the Supreme Court had suggested that commitment be
accomplished either by resort to section 24-301(a) or the civil commitment provisions.4 5 Rather than "amend" section 24-301 (a) to comstantial review proceeding generally available on this issue, may not consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arbitrarily withhold it from some.
Id. at 110-11.
41. Id. at ill.
42. Id.
43. 19 N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966). Defendant argued
that § 454 was unconstitutional because "it raised the presumption that a defendant
who proves that he was insane at the time of an alleged crime is presumed to be
insane at the time of trial if the trial results in acquittal, and he must thereafter
prove his right to be at large." Id. at 32, 224 N.E.2d at 90, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
44. 387 F.2d 193 (1967).
45. 369 U.S. at 720. Section 24-301 (a) read, in part, at the time of defendant's
commitment in 1961:
Whenever a person is arrested, indicted, charged by information . . .
for or with an offense and, prior to the imposition of sentence . . . it
shall appear to the court from the court's own observations, or from
prima facie evidence submitted to the court, that the accused is of
unsound mind or is mentally incompetent so as to be unable to under-
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port with civil commitment procedures, the Court held the section
inapplicable. 46 Not only were the procedural differences between section 24-310(a) and civil commitment more pronounced than the differences struck down in Baxstrom, but the justification advanced for
the procedural inequality-a presumption of greater danger to the public than those civilly committed because the accused has been found
not guilty of a crime solely by reason of insanity-was virtually the
same as that condemned in Baxstrom.47 "Baxstrom thus might be said
to require the conclusion that, while prior criminal conduct is relevant
to the determination whether a person is mentally ill and dangerous,
it cannot justify denial of procedural safeguards for that determination." 48
Less than a month after the Cameron decision, in Specbt v. Patterson a violation of due process was found in the application of Colorado's
Sex Offenders Act to a person sentenced to prison for an indeterminate
term without notice and full hearing following a conviction for indecent liberties under another Colorado statute which carried a maximum sentence of ten years. 49 The Supreme Court said:
The Sex Offenders Act does not make the commission of a
specified crime the basis for sentencing. It makes one conviction
the basis for commencing another proceeding under another Act
to determine whether a person constitutes a threat of bodily harm
to the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill. That is
a new finding of fact.., that was not an ingredient of the offense
charged. 50
The court found that there was no hearing in the normal sense, no
right of confrontation. Requirements of due process were not satisfied.51
stand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own
defense, the court may order the accused committed . . . for such

reasonable period as the court may determine for examination and
observation and for care and treatment if such is necessary ....
(emphasis supplied).
46. 387 F.2d at 203.
47. Id. at 200-01; Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. at 111. See also Weihofen,
Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 38 TEXAS
L. REv. 849, 855 (1960). Contra, Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.
1958), cert. denied sub nom., Leach v. Overholser, 359 US. 1013 (1959); Hamann,
supranote 15, at 57.
48. 387 F.2d at 201.
49. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).

50. Id. at 608.
51. ld.
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The analogy to defendants acquitted after a voluntary plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity was irresistable. In Bolton v. Harris, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals faced the issue.52 The defendant, acquitted upon his own plea of insanity, challenged the constitutional validity of the District of Columbia post-trial mandatory commitment provisions contending that mandatory commitment without a
hearing on present insanity did not give protection of the laws equal to
those protecting the civilly committed in the District of Columbia.53
The court reasoned that prior to Baxstrom and the 1964 Hospitalization
of the Mentally Ill Act, persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, having demonstrated dangerousness to society through criminal
acts, could reasonably have been treated differently from other mentally ill persons.5 4 The effect of Baxstrom and the 1964 Act, however, rendered insufficient prior criminal conduct as justification for
substantial differences in commitment procedures, and unreasonable
the distinction between those who plead insanity and those who have
the defense thrust ulion them. 5 Moreover, Specht appeared to require
that the finding of present insanity upon which commitment is
predicated be made in a hearing since the trial determined that there
was merely a reasonable doubt as to past insanity.5 6 Instead of declaring the mandatory commitment procedure unconstitutional, the court
chose a reasonable application of the equal protection doctrine which
permitted different treatment of persons acquitted by reason of insanity from civilly committed persons "to the extent that there are
relevant differences between the two groups." 57 Mandatory commitment for a period required to determine present mental condition was
sufficiently justified by the jury's finding of a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense.5" "Once the examination period is over . . .there is no rational basis for denying a hearing ... with procedures substantially similar to those in civil commitment proceedings." " While upholding the release provisions of the
mandatory commitment statute, the court construed the statute to in52. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
53. Id. at 645. -

54. Id. at 649. See Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
55. 395 F.2d at 649.
56. Id. at 651-53.
57. Id.at 651.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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dude those procedural safeguards set forth in the civil commitment
statute.6 0
AN EXAMINATION OF THE VIRGINIA STATUTE

Against this variegated background of legislation and case law, let
us now examine the recently enacted Virginia procedure for commitment and release of persons acquitted by reason of insanity. One rationale advanced for mandatory commitment without a hearing as to
present insanity was the need to observe the defendant's mental condition.6 The Bolton court agreed when it held that commitment without
a hearing is permissible for the period required to determine present
mental condition. 2 This observational period has been made statutorially unavoidable in Va. Code Ann. section 19.1-239(1) which provides
that when the jury acquits a defendant whose defense is insanity or
feeblemindedness at the time the offense was committed,
the court shall place him in temporary custody of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene and Hospitals . . . and appoint three
physicians or two physicians and one clinical psychologist . . .
to examine the defendant and make such investigation as they
deem necessary in order to determine whether or not ... he is
insane or feebleminded and to determine whether his discharge
would be dangerous to the public peace and safety or to himself
and to report their findings to the court.63
This requirement of an automatic observation period reflects the
approval of various legal writers. Lindman and McIntyre suggest that
"[alutomatie hospitalization for a determinate period would allow a
thorough mental examination of the defendant to ascertain his present
mental condition" and would add much to the reassurance of the acquitting jury "that an acquittal on grounds of insanity would not set
loose a criminally dangerous person." 64 Additionally, several state stat60. Id. at 652.
61. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
62. 395 F.2d at 651. See also Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir.

1960).
63. VA. CoDE ANre. § 19.1-239(1) (Cumulative Supp. 1968).
JR., supra note 1, at 367. See also Greenwald,
64. F. LINDmAN & D. McINIrTR,
supra note 5, at 592; Koller, The Insanity Defense: The Need for Articulate Goals
at the Acquittal, Commitment, and Release Stage, 112 U. PA. L. Rnv. 733, 752 (1964);

Note, supra note 23, at 1200; Note, supra note 2, at 459-60, 464; Note, supra note 4,
at 938, 940.
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utes provide for commitment for the purpose of observation in certain
instances. 65 Related statutory antecedents to automatic observation
periods can also be found in the civil commitment procedures of some
states, including Virginia.66 Section 19.1-239(1) speaks only in terms of
temporary custody rather than a determinate period. In sharp contrast, the civil commitment statute requires that a person removed to a
mental hospital upon certification by a justice be examined not later
than twenty-four hours after arrival.67 Should the superintendent decide that the patient be involuntarily confined after this examination,
procedures for a hearing are immediately put into motion. Any suggestion that the temporary custody of section 19.1-239(1) would be
limited to a twenty-four hour examination period is obviated by the
provisions of the Model Penal Code, a source in part for the Virginia
mandatory commitment provisions.6 8 The Bolton court obviously felt
that the civil commitment procedure of examination of the alleged
mentally ill person by the Commission on Mental Health did not provide a reasonable opportunity to observe the subject. "Commitment
...for the period required to determine present mental condition" was
deemed a reasonable application of the equal protection doctrine, the
length of time to be established by the court in each individual case. 9
A jury's finding of a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity at
the time of the offense (or, as in Virginia, where the defendant has
the burden of proving insanity to the satisfaction of the jury)7 0 may
provide sufficient warrant for commitment without a hearing to determine the present mental condition of the accused. It is questionable,
however, in light of the Baxstrom language, whether equal protection
challenges to the time disparities between civil and criminal commitment may be so easily answered by asserting that such jury findings
provide sufficient warrant for treating differently persons. acquitted by
reason of insanity from persons civilly committed. "The equal protection
65. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-515 (Supp. 1968).
66. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 78 (1969); MicH. CoM. LAWS § 14.811 (Supp.
1968); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122 (Supp. 1968).
67. VA. CODE ANN.§ 37.1-79 (Cumulative Supp. 1968).

68. MODEL

PENAL CODE § 4.08

(Proposed Official Draft 1962).

69. 395 F.2d at 651.
70. E.g., Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 70 S.E.2d 284 (1952). The burden
of proof in Virginia arguably denies the defendant due process of law. Cf. Johnson v.
Bennett, 89 S. Ct. 436 (1968); People v. Pearson, 19 IMI.2d 609, 169 N.E.2d 252 (1960)
wherein is discussed the denial of due process of law when the burden of proof is
placed on the defendant to prove his alibi defense.
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problem here is not merely whether or not there is inequality of treatment; the procedural discrimination is patent. What is involved is the
doctrine of reasonable classification." 71 Identical treatment of all persons is not required under equal protection, but equal protection does
require that the absence of identical treatment have some relevance to
the purpose for which the classification is made. 72 The state's only
purpose for observing those acquitted by reason of insanity is to determine present insanity and dangerousness, the same purpose embodied in civil commitment procedures.73 These "civil commitment
procedures, which presumably represent the legislature's judgment on
how best to arrive at 'truth' with respect to the issues of sanity . . .
and [dangerousness], constitute a readily available yardstick for com74
parison."
There remains the possibility, however, that this yardstick may be
found inaccurate when societal and individual interests are weighed
by the court in applying due process and equal protection doctrines.
A survey was conducted on the question of whether an accurate diagnosis could be made without a period of observation and examination
in an institution. 75 A majority of the heads of state and federal mental
hospitals who responded felt that a period of observation and examination in an institution would be necessary for an accurate diagnosis in
at least some cases, with a substantial minority of the opinion that such
a period was required in all cases. 76 "[M]any psychiatrists feel that the
possibility of feigning recovery makes . . . a brief post-trial exam of
little or no validity, and believe that a period of hospitalization is essential to an accurate diagnosis in all cases." 77 It may well be that
twenty-four hours are not "adequate" protection of the public. If
observation is necessary to protect the public, there would seem to belittle doubt in the state's use of its police power to retain not onlythose civilly committed, but also those acquitted by reason of insanity
for a greater period than twenty-four hours to investigate present memtal conditions. The solution is a tenuous one, but it offers a rational
break with the civil commitment yardstick which plagued the Bolton
court.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Note, supra note 4, at 929.
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. at 111.
Note, supra note 4, at 939.
Id. at 934.
Note, supra note 2, at 443-44.
Id. at 444.
ld. at 445.
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If the time disparities do survive equal protection challenges, or
failing this, the court finds twenty-four hours an inadequate period
of examination to protect the public, how much time should be allowed? The Bolton court suggested that the length of time be established by the court in each individual case based upon the same judgments made when the question of competency to stand trial is
raised. 78 A maximum period seems desirable to prevent temporary periods of observation from becoming indefinite periods of confinement
through official lethargy. To survive due process challenges, commitment for observation can last no longer than the period necessary to
determine defendant's present mental condition. Ninety days was the
average of outer limits suggested by heads of hospitals in the previously
discussed survey. 79 This should serve as a maximum period in which
the defendant may be held for observation and examination.
The Virginia mandatory commitment procedure also varies in minor
details with the civil commitment provisions. Under civil certification
the alleged mentally ill person is removed to the hospital or other facility designated by the Commissioner for receipt of persons alleged
to be mentally ill.80 Section 19.1-239(1) provides that the court shall
place the defendant in the temporary custody of the Commissioner of
Mental Hygiene and Hospitals. No mention is made of place of confinement during the observational period. Since the object to be attained in either provision is examination of the person to determine
present mental condition, there appears no reason to doubt that commitment of the person acquitted by reason of insanity would be in a
hospital or other facility designated by the Commissioner for receipt of
persons alleged to be mentally ill.
Additionally, the person alleged to be mentally ill in civil commitment is examined by one or more of the physicians on the staff of the
hospital to which he is certified for examination. 8 ' Pursuant to section
19.1-239(1) the court in which the defendant was acquitted shall appoint three physicians or two physicians and one clinical psychologist,
skilled in the diagnosis of insanity to examine the defendant and make
necessary investigations. This provision obviously reflects the legislature's concern that the patient's interest should have some outside
protection although there is no further provision to indicate that those
78.
79.
80.
81.

395 F.2d at 651.
Note, supra note 2, at 466.
VA. CoDE Aui. § 37.1-67 (Cumulative Supp. 1968).
Id. § 37.1-70.
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physicians appointed to examine the defendant will be other than physicians of state mental institutions. These variations should, however,
raise no constitutional objections.
The Bolton court held:
Once the examination period is over . . . there is no rational
basis for denying a hearing.... [T] hat persons acquitted by reason of insanity have committed criminal acts . . . may tend to
show [that] the requirements for commitment [have been met],
namely, illness and dangerousness. But, it does not remove these
requirements. Nor does it justify total abandonment of the procedures used in civil commitment proceedings to determine
whether these same requirements have been satisfied. [Accordingly, the procedure at the hearing must, under the equal protection doctrine, be] substantially similar to those in civil commitment proceedings.... [S]ince Baxstrom and Specht require [a
hearing], we deem it necessarily implicit in our statute.8 2
That a hearing after the observation period is necessarily implicit in
section 19.1-239(1) of the Virginia procedure is doubtful.
"If the court is satisfied by the report, or such testimony of the examining physicians or clinical psychologist as it deems necessary, that
the defendant is insane or feebleminded . . . the court shall order him
to be committed .... Otherwise, the defendant forthwith shall be discharged and released." 83
Doubt resolves into certainty upon comparison of the applicable sections of a proposed replacement to the Model Penal Code, source, in
part, for the Virginia statute, and section 19.1-239(1). Following an
examination of the defendant's present mental condition, psychiatrists
appointed by the court to examine the defendant report their findings.
If the court is satisfied by the report filed, it shall order his discharge.
If the court is not so satisfied and either the commissioner or the acquitted person or some person makes an application for a hearing, the
84
court shall promptly order a hearing.
The most substantial reason for not requiring a hearing prior to
commitment was the need for observation. 5 Once this need is satisfied, there remains no rational basis for denying a hearing. 88 Further82.
83.
84.
85.
text.
86.

395 F.2d at 651-52.
VA. CODE Awx. § 19.1-239(1) (Cumulative Supp. 1968).
Hamann, supra note 15, at 97 (emphasis supplied).
Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943. See also notes 29-32 supra and accompanying
Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d at 651.
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more, acquittal by reason of insanity has no relevance whatever in the
context of the opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill
at all."" Section 19.1-239(1) does not make the commission of a specified crime the basis for commitment. It makes acquittal the basis for
commencing another proceeding to determine whether the defendant
is presently insane or feebleminded and that his discharge would be
dangerous to public peace and safety or to himself. This is a new
finding of fact (present insanity and dangerousness) that was not an
ingredient of the offense of which the defendant was acquitted (insanity at the time of the offense),88 Finally, lack of adjudication of
present insanity for persons acquitted by reason of insanity is unquestionably "out of harmony with the awareness that [the Virginia
legislature] has otherwise shown for safeguarding those suspected of
mental incapacity against improvident confinement." s9
Whenever any patient civilly certified to a mental hospital for examination should be retained, in the superintendent's discretion, following examination, notice of such determination is served on the patient, and his legal counsel.90 At or prior to the service of notice, the
superintendent must inform the patient of his right to a hearing on the
issue of his continued retention, his right to counsel, and his right to
communicate with such attorney." A hearing shall be had if prior
to the expiration of sixty days from the date of admission of the patient it is so requested by the patient, the attorney, any relative or a
friend. At the hearing the court shall hear testimony and examine the
person alleged to be mentally ill, and shall render a decision in writing
as to the patient's mental condition and his need for continued hospitalization. 9 2 Provisions are also made for appeal- should the decision
be adverse to the patient.
With the exception of the right to counsel,94 section 19.1-239 provides none of the procedural safeguards in initial commitment that are
afforded the civilly committed. Even this right in the commitment
proceedings may be non-existent, since it is doubtful that the proceedings referred to in section 19.1-239.1 contemplate the decision87. Cf. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. at 111.

88. Cf. Specht v. Patterson 386 U.S. at 608.
89. Cf. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. at 711.
90. VA. CODE ANN.
Id. § 37.1-80.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. § 37.1-81.
Id. § 37.1-84.
Id. § 19.1-239.1.

S

37.1-79 (Cumulative Supp. 1968).

19691

VIRGINIA PROCEDURE:

COMMITMENT AND RELEASE

making process of section 19.1-239(1). If the right to counsel does
exist, it may be severely limited, since the trial judge may forbid consultation if in his discretion such consultation would serve no useful
purpose. 5 There is no right to appeal the decision of the court reached
pursuant to section 19.1-239(1); appeal is limited to decisions of releaseY If equal protection alone demands that commitment proceedings for persons acquitted by reason of insanity be "substantially similar" to civil commitment procedures, then section 19.1-239 must be
construed to require the panoply of rights which the Virginia civil
commitment statutes provide.
The Virginia criminal procedure has several minor differences with
the civil commitment procedure. Under civil commitment, a court
having jurisdiction of such cases in the county or city wherein the hospital is located shall hear the application for release.9 7 Section 19.1239(1) does not specifically state which court shall receive the report of the examining physicians, but the inference is that the court
in which the defendant was acquitted shall also decide whether the
defendant should be retained or released. Section 19.1-239(6), however, does specifically provide that no trial court other than the court
which ordered the commitment of the person pursuant to paragraph
(1) shall have jurisdiction to entertain any action seeking the release
of persons committed pursuant to paragraph (1), whether the release
is sought through application for a writ of habeas corpus or otherwise.
Habeas corpus petitions by those civilly committed may be filed in the
circuit court of the city in which the hospital is located, or in the
circuit court in the city adjoining the county in which the institution
is located. 98 These restrictions in the criminal procedure appear unobjectionable in that it "assures some degree of uniformity in the handling of each patient." 99
When a person's continued hospitalization is ordered after a hearing,
the question of release procedures arises. In virtually all jurisdictions
release is dependant upon the discretionary recommendation of the
hospital superintendent or an administrative board with no requirement for periodic examinations of the person hospitalized, or the initia95. Id. § 19.1-239.1(b).
96. Id. § 19.1-239(6).
97. Id. § 37.1-81.
98. Id. § 37.1-104.
99. Hamann, supra note 15, at 73.
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tion of habeas corpus proceedings by the patient. 00 Bolton deemed
habeas corpus no longer adequate protection against unwarranted detendon in view of Baxstrom and the 1964 Act. 10 1 The court upheld the
mandatory commitment statute release provisions which provide for
release of the patient upon the hospital superintendent's discretionary
decision; however, civil commitment procedural safeguards requiring
periodic examination of the patient and a right to a court hearing if
one of the examining physicians believes the patient should no longer
be hospitalized were read into the statute under the equal protection
02
doctrine.
Until 1966 in Virginia, a person committed to a mental institution
following acquittal by reason of insanity was confined until the superintendent of that hospital and the superintendent of any other state
hospital pronounced him sane and safe to be at large.10 3 Release could
be sought through initiation of habeas corpus proceedings by the patient.' The Virginia civil commitment discharge provision is devoid
of those safeguards against unwarranted detention which are present
in the District of Columbia civil commitment provisions. Section 37.198 provides that the superintendent may discharge any patient who,
in his judgment, is recovered, is not mentally ill, is not recovered but
whose discharge will not be detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to the patient. 0 5 Any person held in custody as mentally ill
may by petition for a writ of habeas corpus have the question of the
legality of his detention determined. 10 6
Obviously dissatisfied with the forced resort to habeas corpus for
release as a supplement to discretionary institutional action, the Virginia
legislature appropriately created a statutory procedure for release of
persons committed after a successful insanity plea.
(2) If the superintendent of the State mental hospital in which
a person is confined under paragraph (1) of this section is of the
opinion that a person committed to his custody, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this section, is not insane or feebleminded and may
100. For a compilation of statutes, see F. LINDMAN & D. McImRE, JR, s-upra note I,
at 373-82; H. WEHoFEN, supra note 25, at 376-89; see also Note, supra note 2, at 447-49.
101. 395 F.2d at 649.
102. ld. at 652.
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-239 (Supp. 1964).
104. Id. §§ 37-122, -123 (Replacement Volume 1960).
105. Id. § 37.1-98 (Cumulative Supp. 1968).
106. Id. § 37.1-103.
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be discharged or released without danger to the public peace and
safety or to himself, he shall make application for the discharge
or release of such person in a report to the court by which such
person was committed and shall transmit a copy of such application and report to the Commonwealth's attorney for the city
or county from which the defendant was committed. Upon receipt of such application for discharge or release, the court forthwith shall appoint at least two qualified psychiatrists, one of whom
shall be the superintendent of a State mental institution other than
the one in which the person is confined, to examine such person
and to report within sixty days their opinion as to his mental
condition. To facilitate such examination and the proceedings
thereon, the Commissioner shall transfer such person to the appropriate State mental institution located nearest the place where
the court sits.
(3) If the court is satisfied by the application and report seeking the release or discharge of the committed person filed pursuant to paragraph (2) of this section and by the report or such
testimony of the reporting psychiatrists, appointed pursuant to
paragraph (2) of this section, as the court deems necessary, that
the committed person is not insane or feebleminded and that his
discharge or release will not be dangerous to the public peace
and safety or to himself, the court shall order his discharge or
release. If the court is not so satisfied, it shall promptly order a
hearing to determine whether the committed person is at that
time insane or feebleminded and to determine whether his discharge would be dangerous to the public peace and safety or to
himself. Any such hearing shall be deemed a civil proceeding and
the burden shall be on the committed person to prove that he is
not insane or feebleminded and that his discharge would not be
dangerous to the public peace and safety or to himself. According
to the determination of the court upon such hearing, the committed person shall thereupon be discharged or released or shall be
recommitted to the custody of the Commissioner. It shall be the
duty of the superintendent of the institution in which such
person is confined, at yearly intervals commencing six months
after the date of confinement, to make a report of such person's
condition to the court from which he was committed.
(5) At yearly intervals commencing six months after the date
of confinement, and not more frequently, a committed person
may make application to the court by which he was committed
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for his discharge or release and the procedure to be followed
upon such application shall be the same as that prescribed above
in the case of an application by the superintendent of the institution in which such person is confined. 1 7
The official comment to the Model Penal Code notes that applicadons by the patient are limited by what is thought to be the period
necessary to observe him initially (six months) and by the interval
probably necessary for a significant change in his condition to occur
after any application has been denied (one year).108 The one year ban
also prevents nuisance requests for release. More importantly, an adverse decision on an application by the superintendent would not appear to affect the yearly filing right of the committed person.
A

RECOMMENDATION

Paragraph (3) of the statute states that if the court is not satisfied
with the application for release submitted by the hospital superintendent
and the report of the examining psychiatrists appointed by the court,
it shall order a hearing at which the burden shall be on the committed
person to prove that he is not insane and that his discharge would not
be dangerous to the public peace and safety or to himself. It would
be more fitting to rewrite the release procedures by shifting the burden
to the hospital authorities to prove the necessity for further hospitalization. 10 9 Paragraph (2) allows the superintendent to submit a report at
any time; it is his duty to make yearly reports." 0 A committed person may make application for release at yearly intervals, and not more
frequently."' The yearly reporting requirement was obviously intended to force hospital superintendents to think not of confinement
but of treatment and rehabilitation." 2 That bureaucratic actions tend
to be slow, and danger exists that a person sane could be confined indeterminately were obviously factors the legislature considered in creating this statutory procedure for release." 3 Of what greater benefit to
the patient is this procedure than habeas corpus, if the patient has the
burden of proving his eligibility for release? Where the superintendent
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. § 19.1-239(2), (3), (5).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Cf. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. at 734-35 (Clark, J., dissenting).
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-239(3) (Cumulative Supp. 1968).
Id. § 19.1-239(5).
Cf. Hamann, supra note 15, at 69.
Id. at 68.
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and the examining psychiatrists recommend release but the court disagrees, the patient is placed on the horns of an even greater dilemma,
for then the opinions of those who have had the greatest opportunity
to examine and observe the patient become virtually worthless. "These
doctrinal obstacles loom even larger in view of the difficulties which an
indigent [patient] encounters in attempting to obtain expert psychiatric
testimony.... "4 Nor should a negative report by the superintendent
and the reporting psychiatrists force the burden of proof upon the
patient. Conservative opinions are fostered in hospital superintendents
through fear of public criticism if premature release of the patient results in other criminal offenses. 115 Circumstances may divide the interest of the state psychiatrist and the patient."' Attempts by indigent
patients to obtain expert testimony to rebut the opinion of the superintendent are often frustrating if not impossible. 1 7 The purpose of commitment is not punishment but protection and rehabilitation." 81 The issue at release is need for continued hospitalization. The state has greater
resources and superior investigative facilities to prove this need than
does the patient, usually indigent, to disprove it. Rules relating to burden of proof customarily take these factors into consideration."19 Shifting
the burden to the state to prove the necessity for further hospitalization would afford committed patients the full benefit of the statutory
release procedure, and at the same time afford the public protection
20
from improvident release of the dangerously mentally ill.'
The Bolton court upheld the release provision of the mandatory commitment statute even though they differed from the civil commitment
procedures by authorizing court review of the hospital's decision to release a patient. "We do not think equal protection is offended by allowing the Government or the court the opportunity to insure that
the standards for release of civilly committed patients are faithfully applied" in releasing persons committed who had been acquitted of crime
by reason of insanity.' 2' The same could be said of the Virginia civil
and criminal differences.
114. Krash, supranote 16, at 946.
115. Note, supranote 2, at 449 n.134.
116. Cf. Hamann, supranote 15, at 76.
117. Note, supra note 2, at 449. See also Krash, supra note 16, at 946.
118. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d at 947. But see Szasz, Psychiatry,Ethics, and the
CriminalLaw, 58 CoLurm. L. REv. 183, 196 (1958).

119. Krash, supra note 16, at 940.
120. Cf. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. at 734-35.

121. 395 F.2d at 652.
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"A standard for [commitment and] release is central to a proper balancing of social and individual rights and interests." 122 Bolton held that
commitment without a hearing was permissible to determine present
mental condition. Thereafter, a hearing with procedures "substantially
similar" to those in civil commitment was required to show that the
"requirements for commitment, namely illness and dangerousness,"
had been met.'23 The standard for commitment expressed by Bolton
was not substantially similar to the civil commitment standard. It was
identical. "If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and,
because of that illness, is likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty, the court may order his hospitalization." 124
Modifying prior decisions, the court brought the standard for commitment as well as the standard for release in habeas corpus proceedings
into conformity with the civil commitment standard. 25
That the standard for commitment in section 19.1-239(1) is even
similar to the civil commitment criteria is doubtful. Following acquittal
by reason of insanity and an examination period, the court shall order
a person committed if satified that the defendant is insane or that his discharge would be dangerous to the public peace and safety or to himself. 126 In civil commitment, judicial certification to a hospital for examination results if the court finds sufficient cause to believe such person is
or may be mentally ill.'

27

Mentally ill "means any person afflicted with

mental disease to such an extent that for his own welfare or the welfare of others, or of the community, he requires care and treatment." M
If a hearing is requested following the examination, the court shall render a decision in writing as to the patient's mental condition and his
need for continued hospitalization.'1 Discharge results if the patient is
recovered, is not mentally ill, or if not recovered but whose discharge
will not be detrimental to the public welfare, or injurious to the patient. 30
Initial dissimilarities are recognizable and confusion engendered by
the use of the terms insane and feeblemindedness in section 19.1-239
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Hamann, supra note 15, at 81.
395 F.2d at 651.
D.C. CODE AN. § 21-545(b) (1967).
395 F.2d at 651, 653.
VA. CODE ANx. § 19.1-239(1) (Cumulative Supp. 1968).
Id. § 37.1-67.
Id. § 37.1-1.
Id. § 37.1-81.
Id. § 37.1-98.
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and mental illness in the civil commitment provisions. Feeblemindedness
is defined in section 19.1-239(6) but there is no definition for the term
insane. Editorial comments following the definitions in section 37-1
state that the revisors almost uniformly substituted the term mentally ill
for the term insane in revising the Code. This would suggest that the
use of insane in section 19.1-239(1) instead of mental illness was a revision oversight. The standards for commitment nevertheless remain
substantially dissimilar under this interpretation. "The phrase welfare of
others need not carry the same meaning as that attached to the term
dangerous. It is conceivable that cases may arise in which the potential
threat to the welfare of others dictates hospitalization even though the
person involved is not judged to be dangerous." "I'Moreover, civil commitment results only if the person is afflicted with a mental disease to
such an extent that for his own welfare or the welfare of others he
requires care and treatment.:1 2 The terminology of section 19.1-239(1)
invites an interpretation that the person will be committed if he is sane
but dangerous or insane but not dangerous since the person will be
committed if the court is satisfied that the defendant is insane or feebleminded or that his discharge would be dangerous. Analysis of the release
provisions invites a similar interpretation. 133
Although decided under former tide 19, Blalock 'v. Markley lends
support to this suggestion. 134 The court stated that the evidence showed
that Markley was sane, but he had not been pronounced safe to be at
35
large.
Despite the absence of explicit language in the District of Columbia
Code section 24-301, the court of appeals has consistently required a
determination of mental condition in deciding the question of dangerousness. In Overholser v. Leach, the court stated the standard as "freedom from such abnormal mental condition as would make the individual
dangerous to himself...." 136 A proposed replacement to the Model Penal
Code states that release or discharge without danger to the person or
property of others shall require that a person released be unlikely as a
result of his present mental condition to engage in offenses which would
injure the person or property of others.137 A similar construction of sec131. F. LiNmMAN & D. McINTYE, JR., supra note 1, at 17.
132. VA. CoDE ANN. § 37.1-1 (Cumulative Supp. 1968).
133. Id. § 19.1-239(3).

134.
135.
136.
137.

207 Va. 1003, 154 S.E.2d 158 (1967).
Id. at 1006, 154 S.E.2d at 160.
Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d at 670.
Hamann, upra note 15, at 96.
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tion 19.1-239 would bring the standard for mandatory commitment
more in harmony with the civil commitment definition of mental illness.
If the "substantial similarity" test formulated in Bolton survives equal
protection challenges, and the apparent dissimilarities in the Virginia
procedures under the later interpretation escape question, there remains
the task of articulating a more explicit definition of dangerousness, "the
heart of the test for retention and release." 138 Such a task deserves recognition and acknowledgement of the competing and conflicting interests of the individual in liberty and society in protection. Proper assessment of the criteria for dangerousness demands that no penal or
punitive considerations enter into the formulation. Protection of the
public and rehabilitation of the person should guide the search for a
formula which balances these competing interests.
Professors Goldstein and Katz would ask: "what kinds of behavior
are sufficiently threatening to be called 'dangerous' . . . and with what

degree of certainty must the prognosis establish the likelihood of the
kind or kinds of behavior designated 'dangerous' occurring over what
period of time?" Responses to the first question must be evaluated in
relation to yet another question: "what behavior should be classified
dangerous enough to authorize deprivation of liberty by continued detention in a mental institution ... ?"

Dangerous behavior might be construed to include: (1) only the
crime for which the insanity defense was successfully raised; (2)
all crimes; (3) only felonious crimes (as opposed to misdemeanors); (4) only crimes for which a given maximum sentence or
more is authorized; (5) only crimes categorized as violent; (6)
only crimes categorized as harmful, physical or psychological,
reparable or irreparable, to the victim; (7) any conduct, even if
not labelled criminal, categorized as violent, harmful, or threatening; (8) any conduct which may provoke violent retaliatory
violence towards oneself; (10) any comacts; (9) any physical
39
bination of these.1
The standard adopted in a proposed replacement draft to the Model
Penal Code-release or discharge without danger to the person or property of others shall require that a person released or discharged be
unlikely as a result of his present mental condition to engage in the
reasonably foreseeable future in offenses which include physical vio138. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d at 949.

139. Goldstein &Katz, supra note 21, at 235.
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lence which would injure the person or property of others-is deemed
closest to the fifth factor mentioned above. 140
In Ragsdale v. Overholser, Judge Fahy, concurring, suggested danger
comparable to the seriousness of the offense of which the committed
person was acquitted, and if the offense is of a nonviolent character a
more lenient approach to the question of danger is in order.'M But the
court in Overholser v. Russell held that the danger to the public need
or a crime of violence. It is enough if
not be possible physical violence
142
act.
criminal
he commit any
With regard to the second issue-with what degree of certainty must
the prognosis establish the likelihood of the kinds of behavior designated
dangerous occurring over what period of time - the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that the .examining physician is not required to "give an absolute guarantee that the patient will never again
be mentally ill or dangerous. Reasonable foreseeabiity ... is the test." 143
This test, however, confuses the issues of how certain the psychiatrist
must be in a prognosis of future dangerousness occurring and within
what period of future time should the prognosis be predicted. Another
difficulty with the danger in the foreseeable future criterion is that
psychiatrists are forced to make predictions which may be beyond their
competence. Such predictions could result in the lifelong institutionali44
zation of some individuals.
Bolton rejected a standard for commitment and release based upon
dangerousness in the reasonably foreseeable future, substituting for it the
civil commitment test of "likely to injure himself or others due to mental
illness." 14 The substantive law of civil commitment, however, provides
little help in precise articulation of a definitive standard, for it is equally
fraught with indefiniteness. Under the Virginia civil commitment
standard, release would depend upon whether discharge would be detrimental to the public welfare, or injurious to the patient. 4 6 The
shortcomings of this statutory criteria are no less so than those of
47
dangerousness.
140. Hamann, supranote 15, at 84, 96.
141. 281 F.2d at 950.
142. 283 F.2d at 198.
143. Rosenfield v. Overholser, 262 F.2d 34, 35 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

144. Koller, supra note 66, at 750.
145. 395 F.2d at 651.
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-1 (Cumulative Supp. 1968).

147. See generally Greenwald, supra note 5, at 591.
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As Professors Goldstein and Katz stated, "no criteria for 'dangerousness' have been precisely articulated." 148 To this Krash would add that
"none of the solutions advanced is free from difficulty."' 149 Recognition
now of the existence of this problem in the Virginia commitment and
release provisions will permit court and psychiatric experts to examine
and to be aware of the values to be operative in future decisions balancing individual liberty and public safety.
CONCLUSION

As one legal writer said: "In applying civil standards to post-verdict
commitment and release procedures, Bolton exhibited an admirable application of constitutional logic to correct an injustice based on unenlightened fears lightly concealed in legal semantics." I" So could it be
said of the Virginia legislature in enacting a more comprehensive commitment statute applicable to persons acquitted by reason of insanity.
"Indeterminate detention not only threatens the liberty of the individual, but also the very existence of the defense of insanity." 111 The
possibility of a lengthy commitment probably caused many defendants
to consider the alternative criminal conviction path. 152 Today, however,
the release policy for the insane may be favored over the parole policy
for prisoners. 58 But the new commitment statute has not completely
settled the matter of when and how persons acquitted by reason of insanity may be committed and eventually released. Their unfortunate
plight may have been lessened, but the debate continues.
DONALD E. ScEARcE.
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Krash, supranote 15, at 946.
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